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Abstract. Systemic risk in banking systems remains a crucial issue that
it has not been completely understood. In our toy model, banks are ex-
posed to two sources of risks, namely, market risk from their investments
in assets external to the banking system and credit risk from their lend-
ing in the interbank market. By and large, both risks increase during
severe financial turmoil. Under this scenario, the paper shows the condi-
tions under which both the individual and the systemic default tend to
coincide.
Key words: banking system; capital adequacy ratio (CAR); procycli-
cality; agent-based model; financial market
1 Introduction
Understanding of the interplay among banks through several channels is a crucial
issue in the globalized world economy [1,2]. In general, banks obtain their profits
from the difference between deposit interest rates and interest rates in the inter-
bank markets, stock markets, credit markets, and so on. Of course, money flows
and interest rates are deeply interrelated to international economic conditions.
It is recognized that systemic risks are created by interconnection among
banks. Helbing argues that systemic failures and extreme events are consequences
of the highly interconnected systems and networked risks. He proposes a general
theory to analyze, understand and manage systemic failures for various types of
fields in socioeconomic-technological-environmental systems under a framework
of Global Systems Science [3]. He further addresses a list of common drivers of
systemic instabilities that may destabilize anthropomorphic systems over time.
These following drivers are to be considerably significant: (1) increasing system
sizes, (2) reduced redundancies due to attempts to save resources (implying a
loss of safety margins), (3) denser networks (creating increasing interdependen-
cies between critical parts of the network), and (4) a high pace of innovation
(producing uncertainties or ’unknown unknowns’).
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These systemic risks probably stem from the positive feedback loop among
financial markets and banks’ interactions. They can be formed by several reasons
such as leverage trading, trend follower’s trading, loss cut trading, bankruptcy
of banks, bunched sales, housing market and real economy, employment, excess
concentration of wealth, a trade imbalance, political power, extreme low interest
rates, excessive or lack of regulation and so on.
Several types of nonlinear positive feedback mechanisms can concurrently
trigger serious crashes damaging all the financial systems. This study collocates
with that stream of works that aim to estimate systemic risks among banks
under exposures of risky assets traded in the stock market [4].
Some existing studies concern risk propagation through lending and borrow-
ing networks. This approach focuses on interactions of debt and credit among
banks.
For example, Iori et al. analyze the systemic risk in interbank money market
by simulating the banks’ lending activities [5]. Their simulation model assumes
that banks carry liquidity risk caused by the maturity gap between funding and
investment activities. The model introduces a feature according to which banks
pool this risk and further creates the potential for one bank’s crisis to propagate
through the system.
Furthermore, the heterogeneity of banks is analyzed, which can cause knock-
on effects in shock propagation, while the interbank market comprised of ho-
mogeneous banks tends to stabilize absorbing shocks. This model settings, two
types of banks are assumed: those with positive cash and those with negative
cash. Accordingly, they are classified as potential lenders and potential borrow-
ers. Banks invest their money first and lend the remaining part as lending. The
total demand in the market does not always match the total supply. Hence, there
exists default risk of banks due to the shortage of liquidity, and shocks can be
propagated through the system.
As for the performance of the interbank market in its role as a safety net,
the insurance role of interbank lending prevails when banks are homogeneous;
higher reserve requirements can lead to a higher incidence of bank failures. When
banks are heterogeneous in average liquidity or average size, contagion effects
may arise. They found that such effects can be of both a direct (i.e., knock-on
from a failing bank to its direct creditors) and an indirect (i.e., causing criticality
in the system as a whole) nature.
Despite the potential to create contagion, they insist that inter-bank lending
always seems to stabilize the system: the elapsed time before the first failure
is always observed to increase with connectivity. Their simulation results also
indicate that heterogeneity alone can contribute to instability.
Gai and Kapadia study that probability and potential impact of contagion,
which are influenced by aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, change in network
structure, and asset market liquidity [6].
A model of contagion in arbitrary financial networks is developed by using
directed and weighted network model to express the widespread transmission of
shocks through numerical simulation about shock transmission.
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The banks are linked together by their financial claims on each other, includ-
ing through interbank markets and payment systems. They model contagion
stemming from unexpected shocks in complex financial networks with arbitrary
structure and then use numerical simulations to illustrate and clarify the intu-
ition underpinning our analytic results.
The result of simulation analysis suggests that financial systems exhibit a
robust-yet-fragile tendency: while the probability of contagion may be low, the
effects can be extremely widespread when problems occur. Adverse aggregate
shocks and liquidity risk amplify the likelihood and extent of contagion.
It is also clarified why the resilience of the system in withstanding fairly
large shocks prior to 2007 should not have been taken as a reliable guide to its
future robustness. It means that we need more flexible assumption when building
network based model.
The approach provides a first step towards modelling contagion risk when
true linkages are unknown. They suggest a further extension of the analysis
by relaxing the assumption that the defaulting bank is randomly selected and,
considering the implications of targeted failure affecting big or highly connected
interbank borrowers. As mentioned, added realism could also be incorporated
into the model by using real balance sheets for each bank or endogenizing the
formation of the network. Such extension of the model would be beneficial from
a systemic risk research viewpoint.
Haldane and May study possible effects of risk optimization by individual
financial institutions on the stability of the system as a whole [7]. They explore
the interplay between complexity and stability in deliberately simplified models
of financial networks to find some policy lessons with the explicit aim of mini-
mizing systemic risk. They claim that the network dynamics of what might be
called ’financial ecosystems’ has parallels with ecology, where too much complex-
ity implies instability. The well-known arbitrage pricing theories (APT) as well
as other derivative pricing theories often assume perfect competition, market
liquidity, no-arbitrage and market completeness. Crucially, these conditions are
not always satisfied; therefore, trading activities that assume these conditions
can destabilize markets, having possible effect on the dynamical behavior, while
such activities seem to be successful at an initial stage.
Haldane and May also delve into the shock propagation mechanism, applying
network system approach originally developed in ecology. A financial system is
expressed as a network in which many banks are connected with credit linkage,
forming an inter-bank money market. An initial shock that arose in some node
are transmitted to other connected nodes when their shock absorbing capacity
of a node is insufficient to the incoming shock.
In addition the liquidity factor plays a major role in the shock propagation.
The losses in the value of bank external assets, caused by a generalized fall in
market prices, such liquidity shocks amplify as more banks fail accordingly. Thus,
relatively small initial liquidity shocks have the potential to make strong contri-
butions to systemic risk. Iori et al. also emphasize the cascading effect of shock
propagation, in which diminished availability of interbank loans caused serial
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failure of liquidity funding by banks. These complicated interactions between
nodes in a network cannot be clarified by the traditional economic theory.
The traditional rationale for setting regulatory capital/liquidity ratios is that
idiosyncratic risks are reduced to the balance sheets of individual banks. Pru-
dential regulation is following in the footsteps of ecology, which has increasingly
drawn on a system-wide perspective when promoting and managing ecosystem
resilience.
The scientists also listed two policy implications from their topological net-
work analysis: the diversity across the financial system and the modularity within
the financial system. They warn that banks’ balance sheets and risk management
systems became increasingly homogeneous; homogeneity bred fragility. As for the
modularity within the financial system, it protects the systemic resilience of both
natural and constructed networks by limiting the potential for cascades. They
emphasized the importance of encouraging modularity and diversity in banking
ecosystems as a means of buttressing systemic resilience.
One of the authors (P.T.) proposed DebtRank to measure default risk of
banks. The paper assumes that bankruptcy may influence the balance sheet
situation of other banks and that contagion effect may happen [8]. DebtRank is
one of the indicators to calculate the risk of the contagion effect for each bank.
Reducing procyclicality and promoting countercyclical buffers is one of the
most important issues in the Basel III Accords [9]. It provides a message that
“One of the most destabilizing elements of the crisis has been the procyclical
amplification of financial shocks throughout the banking system, financial markets
and the broader economy.“
In this study, we focus on correlations among financial assets. This may play a
role of common factors and create procyclicality. To do so, we study interactions
between banking systems and the financial market. Financial prices fluctuate
and show volatility clustering and volatility synchronization. In fact, fluctuations
of financial prices seem to be random, however, volatilities of financial assets
are sometimes synchronous. If many banks have positions in financial assets,
then their capital adequacy ratios sometimes may vary synchronously. This is a
common factor effect of financial assets in balance sheet. In order to investigate
this scenario, we construct an agent-based model consisting of banks and the
financial market.
The linkage via underlying common factor is widely observed in the financial
market. Shocks prevail to the whole market in a short period of time through
arbitrary transactions by market participants. Individual assets return, there-
fore they tend to synchronize in terms of volatility fluctuation: a large scale of
volatility fluctuations are observed at specific timing, resulting in a market shock
event.
Asset price fluctuation in the financial markets have been studied by many
researchers [10,11]. Stochastic models as well as agent-based models are well-
studied [12,13]. Some researchers pay a significant attention to the network ef-
fects in the financial markets [14,15]. From empirical studies on financial time
series, asset price fluctuations follow fat-tailed distributions. This is often mod-
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eled as a random number drawn from a student t distribution [1,16,17]. However,
since asset price fluctuations are generated from trading by market participants,
high volatility regimes are not independent of banks behavior.
How does banks behavior affect financial markets and how do the asset price
fluctuations influence banks’ behavior? This forms a circular causality. This is
a main question of this study. To do so, we consider a toy model of interaction
among banks by means of an agent-based model. We assume that banks have
lending and borrowing relationships with other banks and invest their money
to an asset. We focus on two viewpoints: capital adequacy ratio and interaction
between lending and borrowing network and financial markets.
One of the authors (T.I.) analyzed the Japanese stock market by applying
GARCH model to individual stock returns separately [18]. The result shows
the market-wide synchronization of extreme volatilities (larger than the 95th
percentile of the empirical distribution of individual volatilities), which occurred
mostly at crisis periods.
The purpose of this paper is to clarify influence of procyclicity. We assume
that financial assets in the balance sheet play a role as a common factor in a
banking system. From an agent-based model consisting a banking system and
financial market, we construct a model and measure correlation of capital ad-
equacy ratio among banks. We found synchronous behavior of the capital ade-
quacy ratio influenced by financial markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines a banking sys-
tem; Section 3 defines behavior of market participants; Section 4 shows a model
of chain-reaction bankruptcy; Section 5 exhibits simulation results obtained from
the proposed agent-based model; Section 6 tells some limitations of the model;
Section 7 is devoted to draw our conclusions.
2 Banks
Let us consider N(t) banks which interplay one another under lending-borrowing
relationships and a financial market at time t.
Suppose a balance sheet consisting of liabilities and assets in bank i (See Fig.
1). Equity Ei(t), Deposit Di, and Debt Li(t) are categorized as liabilities and
Cash Ci(t), CreditKi(t) and Financial assets Ji(t) as assets. We assume that the
bank holds ni(t) units of risky assets with their market price S(t) and cash Ci(t)
at time t. Therefore, the value of risky asset is estimated as Ji(t) = ni(t)S(t).
Since the bank is initially financed by their bank depositors, we assume that
ni(0) > 0 and Ci(0) > 0. The bank deposit is described as Di, which is a
constant value. If the i-th bank buys Vi(t) units of risky asset then ni(t+∆t) =
ni(t) + Vi(t) and Ci(t + ∆t) = Ci(t) − Vi(t)S(t). If the i-th bank sells then
ni(t +∆t) = ni(t) − Vi(t) and Ci(t +∆t) = Ci(t) + Vi(t)S(t). Vi(t) represents
volume traded by the bank i at time t.
Besides, a lending and borrowing relationship exists among banks. Such a
relationship can be described as an asymmetric weighted matrix. Let Wij(t) be
expressed as a lending amount from the bank i to the bank j at time t. The
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Fig. 1. A model of balance sheet. Ei(t) represents Equity, Di(t) Deposit, Li(t)
Debt, Ci(t) cash, Ki(t) Credit and Ji(t) financial assets.
debt of the i-th bank at time t towards other banks is estimated as Li(t) =∑N
j=1Wji(t), and the bank credit of the i-th bank at time t is estimated as
Ki(t) =
∑N
j=1Wij(t). Therefore, the survival condition of the i-th bank is given
by
Ci(t) + Ji(t) +Ki(t) > Li(t) +Di (1)
Namely, if Ci(t)+Ji(t)+Ki(t) ≤ Li(t)+Di then the i-th bank goes bankruptcy.
We assume that the counterparties of the i-th bank can receive ρ× 100 percent
(0 < ρ < 1) of their exposure. This can be expressed as temporal development
of interconnection among banks. The update rule of Wji(t) is given for all i as
Wji(t+∆t) =
{
Wji(t) (If Ci(t) + Ji(t) +Ki(t) ≥ Li(t) +Di)
ρWji(t) (Otherwise)
(2)
If we can simulate the agent-based model repeatedly, then from the relative
frequency we can estimate the default probability of the i-th bank as
Pr[Ci(t) + Ji(t) ≤ Di + Li(t)−Ki(t)] ≈ M [Ci(t) + Ji(t) ≤ Di + Li(t)−Ki(t)]
Msim
,
(3)
where Msim is the number of simulations, M [Ci(t) + Ji(t) < Di+Li(t)−Ki(t)]
is the number of defaults for the i-th bank.
Dynamic Interaction Between Asset Prices and Bank Behavior 7
The bank imust pay money to both depositors with deposit interest rates and
lenders with interest rates in the interbank market every step. Such payments
write
Ci(t+∆t) = Ci(t)− λDDi − λILi + λIKi, (4)
where λD represents the deposit interest rate, and λI the interest rate in the
interbank market. We assume that the interest rate is given by
λ =
(
1 + (annual interest rate)
) ∆t
365 − 1, (5)
where ∆t is measured daily. In the case that the annual interest rate is 1% and
∆t = 1 [day], the daily interest rate is estimated as 2.67262× 10−5.
Capital requirements are designed to ensure that banks hold enough resources
to absorb shocks to their balance sheets. A standard measure of the health of
individual banks is their capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Introduced in 1988 with
the Basel I Accords, the CAR is calculated as the total regulatory capital of
a bank divided by its risk-weighted assets. The Basel II revision refined the
calculation of risk weights and incorporated three major components of risk:
credit, operational, and market risk. The Basel II revision also set the minimum
CAR at 8 percent for international banks and at 4 percent for domestic banks.
Conservatively-run banks tend to have high CARs to cushion against higher
losses. In addition, Basel III revision introduced that a Total Capital Ratio to
total Risk Weighted Assets should be larger than 8 % and that the common
Equity Tier 1 to risky asset ratio is greater than 4.5%.
Bank capital to assets is the ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets.
Capital and reserves include funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, gen-
eral and special reserves, provisions, and valuation adjustments. Capital includes
tier 1 capital (paid-up shares and common stock), which is a common feature
in the banking systems all over the world and total regulatory capital, which
includes several specified types of subordinated debt instruments that need not
to be repaid if the funds are required to maintain minimum capital levels (these
comprise tier 2 and tier 3 capital). Total assets include all non-financial and
financial assets. CAR is defined as
CAR =
(Tier 1 capital) + (Tier 2 capital)
(Risk weighted assets)
, (6)
where Tier 1 capital T1 is defined as
(Tier 1 capital) = (paid up capital) + (statutory reserves)
+ (disclosed free reserves)
− (equity investment in subsidiary)
− (intangible assets)
− (current and b/f losses),
and Tier 2 capital T2 as
(Tier 2 capital) = (Undisclosed Reserves)
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+ (General Loss reserves)
+ (hybrid debt capital and subordinated debts).
The risk-weight depends on kinds of assets. In the case of cash and government
securities, the weight is 0%. Mortgage loans have 50% (Basel I) weight or 35%
(Basel II). Other loans and assets have 100% weight (Basel I) or 75% to 150%
(Basel II). Stocks have 100% weight (Basel I and II).
In the case of our model, we assume that the total capital adequacy ratio is
approximated as
CARi(t) =
Ci(t) + Ji(t) +Ki(t)− Li(t)−Di
Ji(t) +Ki(t)
× 100(%), (7)
and that the Tier1 common equity adequacy ratio is approximated by a ratio of
Tier1 common equity (Cash and Common Stocks) to risk weighted assets and
operational risk;
CEARi(t) =
Ci(t)
Ji(t) + (1 + λIc)Ki(t) + c|yi(t)|Vi(t)S(t) × 100(%), (8)
where c is a positive constant less than 1. The Basel II Accords forced the
requirement such that CARi(t) ≥ 8 (%). The Basel III Accords have required
CEARi(t) ≥ 4.5 (%) since 3Q in 2013 in addition to this.
This is a model of a banking system. The variables in this model are listed
in Tab. 1.
Table 1. Variables of banks and a market.
variables items
t time
N(t) The number of market participants
Ntf (t) The number of trend followers
S(t) Market price of risky assets
Ei(t) Equity
Di Deposit
Li(t) Debt
Ci(t) Cash
Ki(t) Credit
Ji(t) Financial assets
Wij(t) Lending amount from bank i to bank j
ni(t) Holding volume of financial assets
Vi(t) Traded volumes
yi(t) investment attitude
Fig. 2 shows averaged CAR in 8 countries from year 2000, where data can
be downloaded from Worldbank’s DataBank [19]. The graph tells us that the
averaged CAR varies in time and that it fluctuates in a range from 4.0 to 12.0.
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The average CAR of United States maintains more than 8 %. France, Germany
and Japan are less than 6 % from 2000 to 2010. Canada and South Korea take
more than 6 %.
However, these values are averages over the country. A specific bank takes
larger values than the average. For example, although the Japanese averages are
less than 5 %, Japanese three mega banks (Mizuho Financial Group, Mitsubishi
Tokyo Financial Group and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group) take larger val-
ues; Mizuho Financial Group shows 15.09% total capital ratio as of December
31, 2014 [20] (See Tab. 2). Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group also shows 15.39%
total capital ratio as of September 31, 2014 [21] (See Tab. 3). Sumitomo Mit-
sui Financial Group shows 16.79% total capital ratio as of December 2014 [22]
(See Tab. 4). The current capital-to-asset ratios reported by Worldbank are av-
eraged over banks belonging to countries not regarding total amounts of banks
equity and assets. It may be necessary to compare the capital adequacy ratios
in accordance with sizes of banks’ capital and risk weighted assets.
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Fig. 2. COLOR ONLINE. Averaged bank capital adequacy ratio in 8 coun-
tries (Japan, United States, Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland, Korea Rep
and Canada) for a period from 2000 to 2013.
3 Market mechanism
The risky assets are traded through a common market. The bank traders buy and
sell their risky assets. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the investment
attitude in the financial market is determined on the basis of the last change in
the market price.
10 Aki-Hiro Sato and Paolo Tasca and Takashi Isogai
Table 2. Mizuho Financial Group, as of December 31, 2014.
Items Amount Basel III Template No.
Tier1 capital 7,481,242M JPY 45
Teir2 capital 2,181,862M JPY 58
Total capital 9,663,105M JPY 59
Risk weighted asset 64,023,907M JPY 60
Tier1 CAR 11.68% 62
Tier1 CAR (Common Equity Teir1) 9.25% 61
Total CAR 15.09% 63
Table 3. Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, as of September 31, 2014.
Items Amount Basel III Template No.
Tier1 capital 12,726,118M JPY 45
Tier2 capital 3,313,073M JPY 58
Total capital 16,039,191M JPY 59
Risk weighted asset 104,160,164M JPY 60
Tier1 CAR 12.21% 62
Tier1 CAR (common Equity Tier 1) 10.97% 61
Total CAR 15.39% 63
Table 4. Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, as of December 31, 2014.
Items Amount Basel III Template No.
Tier1 capital 8,366,228M JPY 45
Tier2 capital 2,547,949M JPY 58
Total capital 10,914,178M JPY 59
Risk weighted asset 64,992,642M JPY 60
Tier1 CAR 12.87% 62
Tier1 CAR (common Equity Tier 1) 11.17% 61
Total CAR 16.79% 63
The market participants are classified into two types; trend followers and
contrarians. The trend followers are traders who want to buy (sell) assets when
their price goes up (down). The contrarians are traders who want to buy (sell)
assets when their price goes down (up). Suppose that N(t) banks trade a single
asset at time t. It is assumed that the banks can take three investment attitudes
coded as three states (buying: 1, selling: -1, and waiting: 0):
yi(t+∆t) =


1 with probability p
(+)
i (R(t))
0 with probability 1− p(+)i (R(t)) − p(−)i (R(t))
−1 with probability p(−)i (R(t))
, (9)
where
p(+)(R) =
1
2
erfc
(θ2i − aiR√
2σ
)
, (10)
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p(−)(R) =
1
2
erfc
(aiR− θ1i√
2σ
)
. (11)
ai is a parameter which determines behavior of banks. If ai > 0, then the i-th
bank is a trend follower. If ai < 0, then the i-th bank is a contrarian. θ1i and θ2i
are parameters of the i-th bank (θ1i < θ2i). The value of σ(> 0) represents the
uncertainty of decision.
In fact, there are some categories of banks such as investment, retail and
central banks. Central banks sometimes trade stocks for non-profit making but
policy-oriented purposes (e.g., asset purchase for monetary easing). Investment
banks and retail banks have different risk preference to financial markets. These
differences can be tuned by parameters ai, θ1i and θ2i. The parameters strongly
depend on market conditions and banks’ risk appetite. However, we do not have
enough information about banks’ risk appetite in general. We need to infer model
parameters from available information about macro economic conditions, bank
balance sheet, and market sentiments. This problem arises other problems that
are not meant to be investigated in this paper. Parameter estimations should be
seen as an important future tasks.
These are models of response curves between perception (price change) and
three types of investment attitudes. We use these curves that relate a price
change to investment attitude. Fig. 3 shows the probabilities for three investment
attitude. The probabilities can be adjusted by using θ1i, θ2i, a and σ. Specifically,
θ1i and θ2i are parameters to describe a range of unresponsiveness to the price
change. While θ1i normally takes negative values, θ2i takes positive values. The
mode of p(0)(R) is equivalent to (θ1i + θ2i)/2. If we differ |θ1| from |θ2|, then we
can express asymmetric response of price changes to investment attitudes. This
is also understood from probit-logit reasoning.
Furthermore, it is assumed that excess demand for a risky asset
∑N
i=1 Vi(t)yi(t)
drives the market price. The volume traded by the bank i is assumed to be pro-
portional to its amount of equity:
Vi(t) = η
(
Ci(t) + Ji(t) +Ki(t)− Li(t)−Di
)
, (12)
where η is an investment ratio taking from 0 to 1. There is a general strate-
gic framework to control risk from price fluctuations in banking based on an
amount of bank’s risk-based capital. In general, banks should trade risky as-
sets under the limit of its economic capital. This is a fundamental requirement
in economic capital management [23]. The risk-based capital is basically linked
with the amount of equity, although it is complicated to calculate risk-based
capital exactly from balance sheet data. Therefore, we use an amount of equity
to determine the volume traded by the bank.
To guarantee positive market prices, the following log return is chosen:
R(t) = logS(t+∆t)− logS(t), (13)
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Fig. 3. COLOR ONLINE. The relationship between a price change and prob-
abilities of investment attitudes at (a) θ1i = −1.0, θ2i = 1.0, ai = 1.0, and
σ = 2.0. (b) at θ1i = −2.0, θ2i = 0.4, ai = 1.0, and σ = 3.0.
and the log returns are proportional to the excess demand,
R(t) = γ
N∑
i=1
Vi(t)yi(t), (14)
where γ is a positive constant to represent the response of the return to the
excess demand. This constant is associated with price elasticity.
From Eqs. (13) and (14), we have
S(t+∆t) = S(t) exp
(
γ
N∑
i=1
Vi(t)yi(t)
)
. (15)
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After the bank trades stocks, the bank’s amount of cash and the holding
number of stocks is updated. For the buyer side, if Ci(t) ≥ Vi(t)S(t) then
Ci(t+∆t) = Ci(t)− Vi(t)S(t), ni(t+∆t) = ni(t) + Vi(t). (16)
For the seller side, if ni(t) ≥ Vi(t) then
Ci(t+∆t) = Ci(t) + Vi(t)S(t), ni(t+∆t) = ni(t)− Vi(t). (17)
4 Debt exposure
The i-th bank has equity Ei(t) = Ci(t) + Ji(t) +Ki(t)−Li(t)−Di(t) at time t.
If Ei(t) is less than zero, we define that the i-th bank goes bankrupt. Thus, it
would be useful to formalize the Default Event (DE) such that
DE := E = 0 := CAR(J +K)/100%, (18)
which can be also seen as a function in terms of CAR.
Let us assume that a symmetric weighted matrix Wij(t) describes a lending
and borrowing relationship among banks at time t. The debt of the j-th bank is
estimated as Lj(t) =
∑N
i=1Wij(t). The default impact of the bank i at time t is
denoted as Wij(t). In order to estimate the worst case scenario, we assume that
ρ in Eq. (2) is set as zero (ρ = 0). If we use a nonzero value for ρ, then we can
simulate the case where some percentage of the debt of j-th bank to i-th bank
can be collectible.
Let Q
(n)
i be a cumulative loss of the bank i in the n-th iteration. If we
introduce a binary variable h
(n)
j such that h
(n)
j = 0 (normal) and h
(n)
j = 1
(default), then the cumulative losses of the bank i can be calculated as
Q
(n+1)
i = Q
(n)
i +
N∑
j=1
W
(n)
ij h
(n)
j , (19)
where W
(n)
ij is updated as
W
(n)
ij =
{
W
(n−1)
ij (h
(n−1)
j = 0)
ρW
(n−1)
ij (h
(n−1)
j = 1)
. (20)
with the initial conditions given by
Q
(0)
i = 0, W
(0)
ij =Wij(t). (21)
If the cumulative loss Q
(n)
i of the bank i becomes greater than its equity Ei(t)
Q
(n)
i > Ei(t), (22)
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then we recognize that the bank i goes bankrupt and set h
(n+1)
i = 1 (it becomes
default) otherwise h
(n+1)
i = h
(n)
i . We obtain the new matrix at time t +∆t as
Wij(t+∆t) =W
(∞)
ij .
Our interest is to understand the total losses over all the banks, which is
denoted as H(t), triggered by the default of the bank j, which is estimated as
the total losses
Hi(t) =
∑
j 6=i
h
(∞)
j
(
Cj(t) + Jj(t) +Kj(t)
)
, (23)
H(t) =
N∑
i=1
Hi(t), (24)
under the initial condition h
(0)
i = 0 (i 6= j). Cj(t) + Jj(t) +Kj(t) is assumed
to be the economic value of the bank j.
5 Simulation
In order to compute this algorithm, we set parameters as shown in Tab. 5.
We sample parameters from a uniform distribution. In fact, some relationships
between parameters do exist and they are time-dependent. However, the purpose
of this numerical simulation is to show the interplay between financial markets
and the trend followers and how it can play a role of the positive feedback
mechanism and procyclical motion of market prices. If we have detailed data on
banks, we can set more realistic parameters. Moreover, it is difficult to obtain
information about the behavior of all the banks, as mentioned above. We should
consider a way to set reliable parameters from available information about banks
balance sheets, however, such an extension makes a problem more complicated.
The is an important issue to be analyzed and discussed in future studies.
In our numerical simulation, we assume that the interest rate (5%) is higher
than the deposit interest rate (1%) but one is not much higher than the other.
The current parameter model setting is the toughest case scenario. If we set
interest rates higher than the deposit rates, then we can simulate a safer case
scenario than the assumptions given by the model presented.
We also selected the total cash possessed by banks at time t defined as
Ctotal =
N∑
i=1
Ci(t), (25)
and the total number of stocks held by banks at time t computed by
ntotal =
N∑
i=1
ni(t), (26)
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Table 5. Model parameters
The initial number of banks N(0) = 100
The initial market price S(0) = 1
θ1i sampled from the uniform distribution U(−1.0,−0.3)
θ2i sampled from the uniform distribution U(0.3, 1.0)
a¯i sampled from the uniform distribution U(a0, a0 + 2.1)
ai(t) a¯i + a
′
i(t), where a
′
i(t) is sampled from U(−σa, σa)
σ sampled from the uniform distribution U(3.0, 4.0)
Ci(0) sampled from the uniform distribution U(2000, 3000)
ni(0) sampled from the uniform distribution U(2000, 3000)
Wij(0) sampled from the uniform distribution U(100, 500)
Di sampled from the uniform distribution U(100, 200)
Deposit interest rate λD = 2.7262 × 10
−5(1%)
Interbank interest rate λI = 1.3368 × 10
−4(5%)
Investment ratio to equity η = 0.001
Price elasticity constant γ = 0.1
Randomness of ai(t) σa = 0.3
recovery ratio ρ = 0.0
Averaged number of links 6
Lending money Wij sampled from the uniform distribution U(100, 500)
as representative quantities describing conditions of banks. The ratio of the trend
followers to the total traders
α(t) =
Ntf (t)
N(t)
, (27)
where Ntf (t) is the number of trend followers. Fraction α(t) is used as a pa-
rameter to characterize the financial market at time t. We can control α(t) by
changing ai(t) for every bank i at time t. Usually, the fraction of the number
of trend followers to the total number of market participants varies in time
due to the evolution of the mechanism of participants’ trading strategies. To
consider the temporal dependence of fraction α(t), we introduced some random-
ness to ai(t) = a¯i + a
′
i(t), where a
′
i(t) is sampled from the uniform distribution
U(−σa, σa). Here σa is a positive constant.
Fig. 4 shows the market prices at (a) α(0) = 0.31, (b) α(0) = 0.48, (c) α(0) =
0.56, and (d) α(0) = 0.75. α(0) = 0.31 (contrarians-dominant market) represents
a case where contrarians are dominant in the market. α(0) = 0.48 (contrarians-
predominant-market) corresponds to a case where contrarians are still dominant
but trend followers are more in number than in the case of α(0) = 0.31. In
the case of α(0) = 0.56 (trend-followers-predominant market), trend followers
are more than contrarians in the market. α(0) = 0.75 (trend-followers-dominant
market) shows a case where trend followers are dominant in the market. We
compare the four cases and examine dependency of α(t) on the market condition.
Tab. 6 shows descriptive statistics of the market prices for the four cases. As
shown in Fig. 5, we confirmed that α(t) fluctuates with some variance and slightly
varies in time due to a bankruptcy of banks. Namely, if a bank goes bankrupt
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at time t, then N(t + 1) = N(t) − 1. If it is further a trend follower, then
Ntf (t+ 1) = Ntf (t)− 1.
The duration of these plots corresponds to 100 years (36,500 days). Fig. 6
shows the total amount of cash and Fig. 7 shows the total amount of risky assets.
Tabs. 7 and 8 show descriptive statistics of the total amount of cash and risky
assets.
When the market price goes down, the total amount of risky assets decreases
and the total amount of losses increases. This situation can be confirmed at
α(0) = 0.75.
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of the market prices for four cases.
α(0) Mean Median Var Min. Max.
0.31 0.396906 0.388796 0.002148 0.288575 0.925797
0.48 0.422041 0.419790 0.003362 0.276761 0.890119
0.56 0.268880 0.260136 0.015824 0.025530 0.876253
0.75 0.024344 0.001470 0.004728 0.000013 0.838115
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of the total amount of cash for four cases.
α(0) Mean Median Var Min. Max.
0.31 221025.65 216784.15 434426403.00 193298.04 258798.49
0.48 222981.91 221224.41 471846434.54 190538.46 262366.22
0.56 200522.00 193584.94 686616124.42 163129.25 271543.81
0.75 262675.93 265049.78 959870096.96 179773.39 329123.67
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of the total amount of risk assets for four cases.
α(0) Mean Median Var Min. Max.
0.31 199288.73 193253.00 711326678.75 162122.00 253637.00
0.48 198077.09 199944.00 827698672.91 150323.00 253288.00
0.56 173392.31 167072.00 710520661.60 132277.00 253255.00
0.75 137052.78 128987.00 1839165861.20 68731.00 253252.00
If the ratio of the contraians to the total traders increases, then price move-
ment seems to be mean-reverting. As shown in Tab. 6, the variance of the
contrarians-dominant-market at α(0) = 0.31 is the smallest in the four cases.
Other cases (α(0) = 0.56 and 0.75) show higher volatilities and correspond pro-
cyclical market behavior between bubbles and crashes. As shown in Tabs. 7 and
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Fig. 4. COLOR ONLINE. (a) The market price at (a) contrarians-dominant
market, (b) contrarians-predominant-market, (c) trend-followers-predominant
market, and (d) trend-followers-dominant market.
8 it is shown that the total amounts of cash and risky assets at α(0) = 0.56
become less volatile than other cases. This implies that the total amounts of
cash and risky assets in the banking system of the trend-followers-predominant
market at α(0) = 0.56 change less drastically than other cases (α(0) = 0.75).
Namely, if trend followers are dominant in the market, then the procyclical be-
havior of the market becomes harmful for market participants and it may make
banking systems more unstable.
The cumulative losses H(t) is shown in Fig. 8. It is said that if market
participants are homogeneous, the total amount of losses is less than more
heterogeneous cases. In both the trend-followers-predominant and contrarians-
predominant markets, the number of bankruptcy is larger than the two other
cases such as the trend-followers-dominant and contrarians-dominant markets.
Contrarians may obtain profit from the market when the market price is mean-
reverting. Trend followers may obtain profit from the market when the market
price is procyclical.
Figs. 9 and 10 show scatter plots between the market prices and the total
amount of cash and those between the market prices and the total losses. We
found that mean-reverting price movements may be less harmful to banks than
high volatile price movements.
Fig. 11 shows time series capital adequacy ratio (CAR) at (a) α(0) = 0.31, (b)
α(0) = 0.48, (c) α(0) = 0.56, and (d) α(0) = 0.75. It is confirmed that the banks
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Fig. 5. COLOR ONLINE. The temporal development of α(t); (a) contrarians-
dominant market, (b) contrarians-predominant-market, (c) trend-followers-
predominant market, and (d) trend-followers-dominant market.
which went bankrupt have small CAR. Before the banks went bankrupt, value
of CAR dropped steeply. Therefore, the default probability should be a function
of CAR, which is not homogeneous. In general, a market where contrarians are
dominant shows mean-reverting price movements, and a market where trend
followers are dominant makes the market price volatile. However, the CAR of
the contrarians tends to decrease and the CAR of the trend followers tends to
increase.
We compare sensitivity of the CAR and that of the CEAR for some cases.
Figure 12 shows temporal developments of CAR and CEAR for 100 banks
(α(0) = 0.79). When banks go bankrupt, their CAR decreases eventually, how-
ever, their CEAR does not change. This implies that the CAR can be used as
an indicator to measure banks condition but the CEAR might not be used as an
indicator for such a purpose. The sensitivity of CAR is extremely better than
CEAR. We should recognize the difference of characteristics between CAR and
CEAR.
6 Discussion
Our approach has several limitations. The first problem is related to relationships
between simple and complex agent-based model. Usually, simple agent models
tend to be too simple to apply actual risk estimation. The main purpose of simple
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Fig. 6. COLOR ONLINE. The total amount of cash; (a) contrarians-dominant
market, (b) contrarians-predominant-market, (c) trend-followers-predominant
market, and (d) trend-followers-dominant market.
agent-based models is to specify roles and components assumed in phenomena
which we want to draw. Through a modeling process, we eventually understand
the structure of these problems and we identify roles and components. In our
case, we use simple agent-based model to identify fundamental relationships
among agents and roles of financial assets in balance sheets.
Meanwhile, the main purpose of complex agent-based models is to capture,
reproduce and simulate phenomena. To do so, we also consider how to calibrate
model parameters. Generally speaking, it is not easy to estimate all the param-
eters under a reliable procedure. We sometimes face parameters’ ambiguity to
turn out similar results. Namely, similar results can be created by different sets
of parameters. This problem is related to nonlinearity of parameters.
It is known that a simple agent-based model tends to become a complex
agent-based model through a process of improvement. If we improve our model,
eventually the purpose of our model changes from structure specification to risk
estimation. In this case, we will also suffer from calibration problems.
The second limitation of our approach is parameter calibration. We do not
have sufficient knowledge on actual banking systems. In fact, partial data of
financial and banking systems can be used; however, we do not have all the data
to calibrate model parameters. Furthermore, our agent-based model is too simple
to apply risk assessment of actual banking networks. Even though it is simple, we
can understand interplay between banks and to use it for developing and testing
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Fig. 7. COLOR ONLINE. (a) The total amount of risk assets; (a) contrarians-
dominant market, (b) contrarians-predominant-market, (c) trend-followers-
predominant market, and (d) trend-followers-dominant market.
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Fig. 8. COLOR ONLINE. The total amount of economic lossesH(t) for the four
cases.
indicators. For example, we can recognize that financial assets have a potential
to play a role of a common factor and cash adequacy ratio and capital adequacy
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Fig. 9. Scatter plots between the market prices and the total amount of cash; (a)
contrarians-dominant market, (b) contrarians-predominant-market, (c) trend-
followers-predominant market, and (d) trend-followers-dominant market.
ratio can be used as measures to estimate. Furthermore, if we can calculate their
correlations in terms of banks, we can quantify intensity of common factors.
The third limitation is related to the expressions of the model. We used
a matrix to describe relationships between banks. However, banks sometimes
appear and disappear due to new launch, bankruptcy and M&A. The matrix
representation cannot express such things.
However, our aim is to identify important components in the bank balance
sheet and have deeper understanding among them. Although we model a sim-
plified version of the banking and financial systems, we established a useful
benchmark reference model that clarifies how the feedback loop between bank
behaviors and how asset prices impact of default risk.
According to BIS consolidated banking statistics in 2015Q1 [24], total assets
for all bank nationalities is 70,082.7 (billions of USD), the total amount of loans
and deposits is 65,919.9 (billions of USD) and the total amount of debt securities
is 7,862,0 (billions of USD) (see Table 9). We found that the total amount of
assets is larger than liabilities for debt securities. Namely, we may justify our
hypothesis that the exposure to financial markets is larger than amounts lent
and borrowed in an interbank network.
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Fig. 10. Scatter plots between the market prices and the total losses; (a)
contrarians-dominant market, (b) contrarians-predominant-market, (c) trend-
followers-predominant market, and (d) trend-followers-dominant market.
Table 9. BIS consolidated banking statistics in 2015Q1. The amount is totaled
over all CSB-reporting banks. Amounts outstanding, in billions of US dollars.
items amount
Foreign claims (Immediate counterparty) 27,077.7
Foreign claims (Ultimate risk) 24,231.7
Domestic claims (Immediate counterparty) 46,882.2
Domestic claims (Ultimate risk) 46,627.4
Total assets 70,082.7
Liabilities (Total) 65,919.9
Liabilities (Of which Loans and deposits) 45,095.7
Liabilities (Of which Debt securities) 7,862.0
Liabilities (Of which Derivatives) 6,336.0
Total equity 4,809.1
7 Conclusion and future work
We emphasized the fact that in our suggested model we were able to capture
the relation between banks behavior and asset prices. We described the positive
feedback-loop between banks default probability and asset price dynamics. The
results showed that the procyclical banks’ behaviors (i.e., feedback loop between
default probability and asset prices) can explain the realization of asset price
bubbles and their burst. The characteristic of the interbank market plays in this
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Fig. 11. COLOR ONLINE. Capital adequacy ratio of every bank; (a)
contrarians-dominant market, (b) contrarians-predominant-market, (c) trend-
followers-predominant market, and (d) trend-followers-dominant market.
context a minor role if exposures in financial markets are larger than capital
in an interbank network. From this view, the interbank market simply allows
us to condense the individual default probabilities into the systemic default
probability. The capital adequacy ratio (Leverage ratio) is a useful indicator to
monitor the default probability.
As for the future, we need to check our hypothesis against detailed data
and estimate probability of procyclicality. The model parameters depend on the
macroscopic behavior of financial markets and bank default probability obvi-
ously. However, the parameters strongly depend also on market conditions and
banks risk appetite. Unfortunately, we do not have enough information about
bank risk appetite in general. We need to infer macro economic conditions, bank
balance sheets, and market sentiment. Our paper paves the way to discuss this
important issue in further studies. Therefore, parameter estimations from avail-
able information about actual banks’ behavior are crucial future tasks.
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